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CHANGE has always been a part of the human condition. This is well known. What is not remembered and seldom acted upon is the ac-
celerating rate of this change. Acceleration of change is seen in our total 
environment, in science, in business, and therefore in accounting. 
Three years ago it was said that the year 1910 marked the midpoint 
in man's scientific development. Today a better figure probably is 1915— 
in other words, the midpoint moved at least five years in three years. 
Half the energy consumed by man in the last 2,000 years has been con-
sumed since 1915. Half the minerals and metals ever lifted have been 
lifted since 1915. Twenty-five per cent of the people that ever lived are 
now living. Ninety per cent of the scientists that ever lived are now 
living. It is not hard to believe that ninety-five per cent of the public 
accountants that ever lived are now living. 
We know that the rate of change in our environment continues to 
increase at an increasing rate, but we act as if we did not believe it. The 
human mind seems incapable of projecting along an upward bending 
curve. Instead it looks ahead, although up, on a straight-line basis. This 
means there is ever a gap between man's ability to solve problems and the 
problems that require solution. 
Now what does all this have to do with by subject—accounting for 
goodwill? Really very little so far as I can tell. Recognition of accelerat-
ing change has had a great deal to do with the advancement of accounting 
in connection with many phenomena of the day, such as with respect to 
new types of securities being offered these days by companies, and in 
connection with earnings per share, accounting for income taxes, pension 
costs, and the like. 
But some of the problems to be dealt with in accounting for goodwill 
are as old as accounting: They have some of the same dimensions and 
the same color as those existing when all of us, even the oldest of us, 
took up our study of accounting. Moreover, the progress toward solution 
of the goodwill problems moves at a snail's pace. 
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W h y is this? One reason is the remembrance of pain from goodwill 
abuses of the past. A n d for this I should like to take a glimpse at history 
—skip over it lightly, yet nonetheless highlight it enough to set the stage. 
THREE MERGER MOVEMENTS 
Goodwill considerations have always been associated with merger 
activity. There have been three great merger movements in the history 
of the United States: The first started in the 1890s and continued into 
the early part of the present century; the second came to a peak in the 
1920s, and the third, of course, is with us now in the 1960s. Present-day 
views about goodwill have been importantly influenced by some of the 
developments and especially by the aftermath of the first two merger 
movements. One writer has said about the urge to merge: 
The first great merger movement, dating from 1890 to 1904, was 
relatively simple in motivation. It consisted of building vertical, fully 
integrated, monster corporations for the purpose of . . . dominating 
[markets]. The securities offered were so thoroughly watered that 
it took a generation of industrial growth and the inflation of a world 
war to dry them out. Unlike what happened in the first round, securities 
resulting from mergers today are bone dry when offered. 
The second great merger movement, starting just after the end of 
World War I, was checked temporarily by the sharp depression of 1921, 
and then skyrocketed through all the rest of the 1920s. Corporations 
were merged to provide glamorous new securities for a speculation-mad 
public. Stocks of merged companies sold quickly at huge premiums. 
There are, of course, two major aspects of the goodwill problem: 
(1) its measurement initially and (2) the disposal in financial state-
ments of its initial carrying value. 
The earliest problem concerned its initial measurement, that is, its 
initial carrying value. 
In 1959, Andrew Barr commented on the early origin of this 
aspect of the goodwill problem when he said: 
The principal merger problems perhaps for the entire period from the 
beginning of the century to the present time have been in the accounting 
for assets and surplus. 
M r . Barr then quoted from George O. May, as follows: 
The problems which the profession now face resemble in some respects 
that which embarrassed accountants sixty years ago when the great era 
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of consolidation began. A legal device sanctioned the recording of the 
cost of the assets acquired at the face value of the capital stock plus the 
fair value of any other consideration given therefor. This resulted not 
only in inflated book values, but also in a lack of a basis for depreciation 
charges. 
M r . Barr concluded: 
The effect of this practice was still evident in financial statements of 
many corporations at the time the securities laws were enacted in the 
1930s. 
GOODWILL BASED ON PAR VALUE—1900-1920 
It is little wonder that the accounting writers of the first and second 
decades of the current century in discussing goodwill found it necessary 
to deplore the practice of recording goodwill at an amount equivalent 
to the excess of the stated value of shares issued over the value of the 
tangible assets received. Among such writers were Bentley, Hatfield, 
and Dicksee. 
By 1910 attention, too, was being directed to the second phase of 
the goodwill problem; that is, to the matter of amortization. Interest-
ingly enough, views concerning goodwill amortization have not changed 
materially in the last 50 years. Hatfield wrote in 1916 in part as follows : 
From one point of view it is true that goodwill is the most permanent 
of assets. Anything else, even the factory site may conceivably be sold 
without necessarily terminating the business. But goodwill cannot be 
disposed of without selling the business itself. Furthermore, the very 
indefiniteness of goodwill renders its overvaluation less harmful than 
that of other assets. Everyone knows that the price paid for goodwill 
gives no indication of its present value, and that at any time a new valu-
ation needs to be taken. Hence there is little danger of deception by 
continuing it among the assets at the cost price. But this doctrine of 
the permanence of goodwill seems inconsistent with the theory of valu-
ing it as the purchase of a temporary, terminating annuity. Strict logic 
requires, at least where the price paid for goodwill is definitely based on 
a number of years' purchase of excess earnings, that the valuation 
should be written off in the same number of years. To require the writ-
ing off only when the expected returns are not realized appears unnec-
essarily hard on the stockholders for they are doubly burdened: first, 
by the decline in expected earnings, and then by a further charge against 
the diminished earnings to cover decline in goodwill. To mark down 
goodwill when profits are unusually high is clearly illogical, though it 
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is not thereby discredited in accounting practice, for it reduces the valu-
ation of excess earnings at the very time and in direct ratio to the 
increase in such earnings. Probably the most satisfactory solution is 
ordinarily to write off goodwill in proportion to the number of years 
figured in its valuation, for in any event it is an uncertain asset, and a 
depreciation of even fixed assets (in which class it is somewhat forced 
to include goodwill), while it legally need not be made, is justified on 
the plea of conservatism. And where it is clear that the valuation of 
the goodwill was erroneous, that it is not worth its book value, the best 
method of adjustment is that advocated by Dicksee, to offset the decline 
in its value by a reduction of capital, not by a charge against profits. 
Here in one short passage we see touches of all of the views of 
that time, as well as now—views that tear at each other because they 
start from such divergent premises. 
AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL—1920 to 1940 
The writers of the 1920s and 1930s, Kester, Finney, Paton, and 
others were, in general, accepting the notion that only cost was the 
proper basis for valuing goodwill. Nonetheless, Kester felt it necessary 
even in 1933 to say: 
The practice of setting up goodwill to fill up the difference between 
the true value of assets contributed or purchased and the par value of 
the stock issued can never be contenanced. 
The flaming issue of the 1930s, however, concerned the matter of 
whether goodwill should be amortized. The prevailing view was that 
it should not. Kester said it this way: 
There is usually no logical reason for writing [goodwill] off. When 
profits are large, goodwill is a very real asset. To write it off then is 
not logically consistent. When profits are small and goodwill is accord-
ingly of less value than before, it would hardly be logical to write off 
any amount less than its decreased value, yet the profits at such a time 
are rarely sufficient to stand so heroic a treatment. 
Paton, on the other hand, as long ago as 1922 was saying that in 
most cases goodwill should be written off periodically by charges to 
income, except in the unusual cases where the special factors giving 
rise to goodwill were permanent; in which situation goodwill should 
be continued indefinitely as an asset at unamortized cost. 
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CAMPAIGN DECADES—1930s and 1940s 
It might be said that the 1930s and 1940s represented the "cam-
paign" decades—a campaign to eliminate goodwill from balance sheets. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission certainly was an active force 
in this campaign. W . W . Werntz summarized the Commission's views 
on the subject in Chapter 38 of Contemporary Accounting, published by 
the A I C P A in 1945. He referred to the Commission's inquiries about 
goodwill leading to adoption by a number of companies of programs 
for amortizing it, generally by charges to income. He made it clear 
that the Commission took a dim view of write-offs against capital 
surplus. 
ARB NO. 24 
This then summarizes briefly a bit of the history and a glimpse of 
the environment giving rise to the issuance in late 1944 of a pronounce-
ment by the A I C P A Committee on Accounting Procedure on account-
ing for intangibles. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 24 issued in 
December 1944 dealt with the overcapitalization problem associated 
with goodwill accounting in the early 1900s by stating: 
In the case of non-cash acquisitions, cost may be determined either by 
the fair value of the consideration given or by the fair value of the 
property acquired, whichever is the more clearly evident. 
A s to amortization of goodwill, ARB No. 24 adopted the position that 
goodwill generally was the type of intangible having no limited term 
of existence, but also approved systematic amortization even when 
there were no apparent indications of limited life. The Bulletin did, 
of course, express the Committee's view that goodwill should be amor-
tized or written off as it became evident that its term of existence had 
become limited or had expired. The Committee, however, did not pro-
hibit direct write-offs against capital surplus, but did discourage such 
write-offs. 
ARB NO. 43—ARB NO. 24 MODIFIED 
The next important development was in 1953 when the Committee 
on Accounting Procedure modified certain of the views expressed in 
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ARB No. 24. The modified views were expressed in ARB No. 43, 
and may be summarized as follows: 
(a) Write-offs of goodwill against capital surplus were proscribed. 
(b) Immediate lump-sum write-offs against earned surplus were 
proscribed. 
(c) If not amortized systematically, goodwill should be carried at 
cost, until an event has taken place which indicates a loss or 
a limitation on the useful life of goodwill. 
CURRENT PRACTICE 
This, then, summarizes the present requirements and guidelines 
with respect to goodwill. A s is expected, practice reflects these require-
ments. Accounting Trends and Techniques for 1967 sets forth a sum-
mary of the practices followed by the companies covered in the A I C P A 
annual study of stockholders' reports. Of the 600 companies covered 
in the study, 192 reported a goodwill item in their balance sheets. Their 
practices were as follows: 
No. of 
Cos. Per Cent 
72 38 
43 22 
35 18 
42 22 
192 100% 
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY NO. 10 
So much for history. During the last few weeks the Director of 
Research for the A I C P A has issued a research study on accounting 
for goodwill. The authors of the study are Messrs. George R. Catlett 
and Norman O. Olson. Because the incidence of goodwill is im-
portantly affected by the extent to which business combinations are 
accounted for as purchases rather than as pooling of interests, the 
authors of the study have given considerable attention to pooling-of-
interests accounting. They generally endorse the conclusions expressed 
Goodwill not being amortized 
Goodwill being amortized 
Goodwill shown at nominal value . . 
Accounting basis not determinable 
Total 
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in Accounting Research Study No. 5, authored by Arthur R. Wyatt, 
to the effect that most business combinations, whether they involve 
exchanges of cash for stock or stock for stock, are in effect exchanges 
and therefore should be accounted for as purchases. 
ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL 
As to the accounting for goodwill, the authors of Study No. 10 
conclude in summary as follows: 
(a) The separable resources and property rights acquired in a 
business combination should be recorded at fair value at the 
date of purchase. 
(b) The difference between the value of the consideration given 
and the fair value of net separable resources and property 
rights acquired should be assigned to purchased goodwill. 
(c) The purchased goodwill should be accounted for as a reduc-
tion of stockholders' equity, either by (1) an immediate direct 
write-off to capital surplus or earned surplus or (2) showing 
a deduction from stockholders' equity for several periods and 
later write-off to capital surplus or retained earnings. 
BASIS OF CONCLUSIONS 
Although one would need to consider the entire study to under-
stand the basis for the authors' recommendation about goodwill, per-
haps I do not do too much violence to their analysis by summarizing 
it as follows: 
The investor determines the value of a business enterprise. The 
investor-determined value of a publicly held company is evidenced by 
the market price of the company's stock. Goodwill, being the difference 
between the value of an entire business and the value of its net sepa-
rable resources and property rights, reflects the evaluation of the earn-
ing power of the business by investors. Goodwill is not therefore a 
resource or property right that is consumed or utilized in the produc-
tion of earnings. Rather, it is a result of earnings, or of the expecta-
tions of them, as appraised by investors. Goodwill value represents the 
aggregate opinion of investors and is subject to sudden and wide fluc-
tuations. That value has no reliable or continuing relation to costs in-
curred in its creation, its purchase, or its maintenance. 
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Differences in the nature of purchased goodwill and nonpurchased, 
or internally developed goodwill, do not support differences in account-
ing. The current practice of not recording the cost or value of inter-
nally developed goodwill is appropriate, since internal expenditures 
which create goodwill cannot be identified with the particular values 
which they create. Further, recognition of the value of nonpurchased 
goodwill in financial statements would introduce investor opinions of 
values into the financial statements which are designed to furnish in-
formation which investors use in arriving at their opinions. In short, 
"a capitalization procedure whereby asset values are adjusted for 
nonpurchased goodwill would reduce the rate of return of the most 
prosperous company to the level realized by a representative one. The 
result would be apparent uniformity of earning power although no 
uniformity exists." 
DIFFICULTY WITH CONCLUSION ABOUT GOODWILL 
I do have difficulty with the conclusion expressed in Accounting 
Research Study No. 10 concerning the elimination, or nonrecognition, 
of goodwill. Since I am restricting my comments today to matters 
concerning goodwill, I shall not comment at any length on the con-
clusion concerning the virtual elimination of pooling-of-interests ac-
counting. I am the first to agree that pooling-of-interests accounting 
has gotten out of hand. It has, however, kept goodwill out of some 
balance sheets which are better presented without goodwill. The con-
cept of partial-purchase, partial-pooling is surely a difficult one to ration-
alize. One has to reach a bit, too, to accept the notion that a pooling 
results when a company issues recently acquired treasury stock in ex-
change for another company's stock. There are other weaknesses in 
the guidelines for pooling-of-interests accounting. But these are matters 
that could be cured without banishment of pooling of interests. 
SIMILARITY OF GOODWILL AND OTHER ASSETS 
M y principal quarrel with the study concerns its premise that good-
will by nature is not a resource of the business and calls for accounting 
dissimilar from that accorded the assets of a business. 
I do not believe that purchased goodwill is so different from pur-
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chased tangible assets as to require the strange concept that goodwill 
is an element of value running directly to the investor in or owner of 
a business enterprise. It seems to me that the principal conclusion of 
the study rests on a premise alien to today's accepted structure of 
accounting; that is, on the premise that in paying for goodwill the 
purchasing company is making an advance distribution of expected 
future earnings. A s I see it, acceptance of this premise constitutes re-
jection of another premise that earnings are the result after deducting 
all pertinent costs from revenue, and this latter premise is so basic to 
accounting that to reject it requires substitution of a new structure of 
accounting, and one not articulated in the study. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
In the analysis that follows, permit me to assume throughout that 
the goodwill under consideration arose from a business combination 
in which cash was paid for all the outstanding stock of a company. I 
make this assumption only to eliminate considerations of pooling of 
interests from the discussion. 
Let us assume further that reasonable determinations have been made 
of the fair values of tangible assets and separable intangible assets as 
well as of any amounts appropriately recognizable as additional liabili-
ties. Any excess of the total cash paid over net assets so adjusted then 
is identified as goodwill, an omnibus term used to characterize such an 
excess whatever its elements may be. We can go a long way in resolv-
ing the goodwill problem by insisting upon a careful analysis of what 
was bought when a company was purchased and, as a result of such 
analysis, by first assigning costs to separable assets and then studying 
the elements of the intangible (that is, the goodwill) to which the re-
mainder of the cost is assigned. A s an aside, it may have been seman-
tically unfortunate that such an excess has come to be called goodwill— 
maybe it would have been better to call it something like "going concern." 
WHAT DID THE BUYING COMPANY BUY? 
What is the nature of this asset? What was the buying company 
buying? 
I deem it misleading to focus solely on the notion that the pur-
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chaser was paying for expected extra earnings. Such narrow consid-
eration of the problem, although perhaps not invalid, often leads to the 
inference that the amount of the goodwill should remain in the balance 
sheet as long as the earnings stay up, since that would be evidential of 
the value of the intangible. But that line of reasoning views accounting 
as having solely a balance-sheet valuation emphasis—that an asset need 
not be amortized as long as the value of the asset holds up. A logical 
consequence would be to argue that depreciation need not be recognized 
as long as the productivity of the tangible asset stays up. 
I deem it more fruitful to deal with goodwill by focusing on its 
similarities with tangible assets rather than on their dissimilarities. 
Now back to the question: What does a purchasing company buy 
when it pays for goodwill? 
Going-Concern Elements 
In the first place, it pays for some of the things required to make 
a going concern out of an aggregation of tangible assets. These were 
things that the company acquired had already paid for and had ex-
pensed. In other words, some of the payment went to reimburse the 
shareholders of the company acquired for costs incurred by their com-
pany, which in turn had resulted in lower distributable earnings. To 
put this another way, the purchaser chose to go into business by buying 
an enterprise that was off and running rather than by forming a busi-
ness and incurring separately all the costs required to make a going 
business out of an aggregation of assets, and in doing so he had to 
reimburse the sellers for costs they had incurred to the extent values 
continued. 
Inflation 
In the second place, with respect to these going-concern elements, 
it may be paying out extra current dollars above costs incurred and 
expensed by the company acquired simply because of the inflation that 
has occurred since the acquired company incurred such costs. 
Fortuitous Non-Cost Factors 
In the third place, the purchasing company may have paid for 
some non-cost factors that have resulted in a higher "going concern" 
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value than that of some other companies. These factors may be ex-
ternal to the business or internal and may have risen fortuitously. 
Attitudes and Expectations 
Finally, it may be paying for indefinable factors resting solely in 
its own expectations and attitudes as well as the expectations and atti-
tudes of other investors. This class of factors comprehend all those 
subjective elements affecting the market for a company's stock. Taken 
individually or as a whole, they may at times appear to be irrational. 
For convenience of discussion, I shall characterize these factors as 
(a) going-concern elements, (b) price-level adjustments, (c) fortuitous 
developments, and (d) expectations and attitudes. I recognize that not 
often in a given case is it possible to assign goodwill costs to each of 
these factors; nonetheless, recognition that they are present sheds some 
light on the goodwill problem. 
GOING-CONCERN ELEMENTS 
During the life of a company, costs are incurred and expensed for 
a number of factors that add value to a company in excess of the aggre-
gate value of its separable assets. These factors include such things as: 
(a) Formation of an effective labor force. This would include 
hiring, training, and programs intended to promote low turn-
over and high productivity. 
(b) Development of an effective organization. This would include 
formation of a management team, a sales organization, and 
the like. 
(c) Development of public image and consumer acceptance. - A c -
tivities directed toward these ends would include community 
and public service activities, advertising, and a contribution 
program. 
These factors, like tangible assets, are assets because they are expected 
to benefit the future. The lives of these factors are more difficult to 
estimate and probably more likely to expire abruptly than those of 
tangible assets, but the economic similiarities of these two classes of 
assets are significant. In some instances the probability of future bene-
fits from these intangible factors would seem to continue indefinitely. 
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On the other hand, most of them would appear to have limited life. It 
is doubtful if any significant part of their value persists indefinitely. 
INFLATION FACTORS 
In the preceding section, mention was made of the payment for 
factors as to which a cost previously had been incurred—a sort of cost-
reimbursement analysis. To the extent that current price levels are 
greater than those when the costs were incurred, a higher current cost 
results. No special treatment of this element of goodwill cost seems 
required. Whatever treatment fits the going-concern element fits the 
inflation factor, since one is a part of the measurement of the other. 
FORTUITOUS ELEMENTS 
Some elements of goodwill may arise fortuitously or, at least, with-
out significant cost. Among such factors may be a favorable location, 
favorable tax circumstances, favorable government regulation, and un-
usually outstanding management qualities. Unfavorable developments \ 
affecting competitors may also give a company a relative advantage 
that demands a price in the event the company is acquired. 
The service lives of such factors are, at best, indefinite and, at worst, 
fleeting. Estimates of such service lives perhaps are seldom better than 
arbitrary. 
ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS 
Then there are those indefinite, in fact unidentifiable, factors that 
cause the market values for a company's stock to fluctuate quite apart 
from the developments within a company or within an industry. These 
are those unpredictable psychological factors—call them attitudes or ex-
pectations. A t any given time, the price paid for a company's stock 
may include an "excess cost" simply because the transaction occurred 
when attitudes concerning the company's future are unusually favor-
able. 
Attitudes and psychological factors, of course, are transient and 
often ephemeral. The odds are that any estimation of their duration 
will be wrong, significantly wrong. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
I draw several conclusions from this analysis. 
The first is that goodwill is not so different from tangible assets 
as to justify an accounting treatment outside the basic structure of 
accounting. In sum, this means that the cost incurred in acquiring 
goodwill is to be dealt with as the cost of a resource used in the business. 
The second conclusion I draw is that, in most instances, estimates 
of service lives of the elements of goodwill can be little better than 
arbitrary. As mentioned earlier, some of its elements have fleeting life 
and some seem to endure for a long time. It is doubtful however, in 
my mind, whether any significant elements of goodwill will last through-
out the life of the company. I am not very hopeful either that in many 
cases would it be possible to develop verifiable evidential matter sup-
porting estimates of service lives of goodwill elements. 
Here, then, is the nub of the problem. Is the nature of goodwill 
such that its cost should be amortized systematically or is this the type 
of asset that should be written off either immediately upon incurrence 
or when an event occurs that demonstrates extinction of an asset? Here 
are three possibilities. I conclude that one thing is common to all of 
them—the charge should be to income. 
Systematic Amortization 
The argument for—I would say, the presumption for—systematic 
amortization rests principally in the premises that the cost of goodwill 
was incurred to obtain future benefits and that the elements so acquired 
do have limited life. The principal argument against systematic amorti-
zation relates to the high degree of uncertainty about the future period 
to be benefitted. How does one estimate the service life of a favorable 
location, the results of an employee training program, a favorable man-
agement situation? Arbitrary estimates seem necessary if systematic 
amortization is to be the general rule. This raises an important ques-
tion about whether periodic determinations of net income based im-
portantly on arbitrary allocations of a cost are more meaningful than 
those based on no allocation at all. It might be argued with consider-
able cogency, on the other hand, that systematic amortization could be 
effected without arbitrary allocation, even though the service life of the 
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elements of goodwill, as elements, cannot be reasonably estimated. This 
might be done by using an amortization rate equivalent to the rate that 
a prudent investor would expect in the way of a return on a certain 
type of speculative investment. The rationale for this approach would 
be that such a rate underlies the expectation of the purchaser when he 
willingly incurs a cost for goodwill, and that the rate therefore is real, 
not arbitrary; hardly verifiable, nonetheless relevant. 
Immediate Charge to Income 
One way to avoid arbitrary allocation would be to write off the 
cost of goodwill upon incurrence by an extraordinary charge to income. 
A n argument for this approach is that costs like goodwill costs are 
traditionally expensed as incurred. Returning again to my so-called 
going-concern elements of goodwill, that is, the cost-reimbursement 
elements, employee training, costs of organizing sales departments, and 
the like. These costs are conventionally expensed as incurred, and to 
the extent that a purchaser pays for these things in buying a business, 
he too should expense the cost as incurred—or so the argument would 
go. There are differences too, however. In the first place, we now 
would be considering a bunching of such costs rather than incurrence 
over perhaps a long period of time. In the second place, immediate 
charge-off flies in the face of reasonableness or prudence. A n investor 
has just incurred the cost, presumably to obtain some future benefits; 
certainly not to obtain benefits that wil l disappear coincident with 
purchase. 
Defer Until an Event Occurs 
Another way to avoid arbitrary allocation is to approach the good-
will problem assuming that no reasonable estimate can be made of the 
service lives of the elements comprising goodwill, by continuing the 
deferral of its cost until an event occurs resulting in limited remaining 
life or extinction of the goodwill, and then writing it off accordingly. 
The principal argument against this approach is that such events often 
do not occur in an identifiable way. Disappearance of the elements of 
value of goodwill may be gradual and in fact may have disappeared 
without any sign of extinction simply because new elements have re-
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placed them—and this may not be an uncommon situation. But then a 
new arbitrary factor may have been introduced—that is, the arbitrari-
ness of the conclusion on whether an event has or has not occurred. 
The next year should see much discussion of this problem in the 
profession, as well as in the financial community. A l l of us should take 
part in this activity. M y principal purpose today was to set the stage 
and indicate a type of analysis of goodwill which, I think, merits care-
ful attention. 
